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        Political polarization has been and continues to be a popular and controversial subject in 
academic research for more than a decade. The term itself, “political polarization,” refers to the 
vast opinion gap that separates Democrats from Republicans, and liberals from conservatives, on 
various political issues.  However, for there to be polarization, mere division on issues is not 
sufficient; there needs to be a deep and substantial divide between the two positions.  When 
looking at the two parties in Congress, for example, there is evidence that Republicans have 
moved further to the right, whereas Democrats have moved further to the left (Poole and 
Rosenthal 2016).  However, does a similar gap exist within the public? 
Although there is a general consensus among political scientists that the U.S. Congress 
has become more polarized in the last several decades, there is a heated debate regarding whether 
congressional polarization is mirrored by polarization in the public.  Some argue that polarization 
of the public has, indeed, increased since the 1950s, but not enough to account for the vast 
increase in the polarization of Congress (Hill and Tausanovitch 2015).  Still others argue that the 
public is not polarized by any substantial measure, and our divide is largely a myth fabricated by 
politicians and perpetuated by the media (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011).  And yet still others 
argue the public is, indeed, polarized (Abramowitz 2013).  So, the question remains: is the public 
polarized? 
        This research is important because polarization affects public policy.  Legislative 
gridlock and/or government shutdowns have become increasingly common.  Increased 
polarization also has pushed more ideologically moderate Congress members to retire in recent 
years, making compromise and bipartisanship more difficult (Theriault 2008).  Regardless of 
whether the polarization of the American public has caused the polarization of the Congress in 
the past, a public that is increasingly more polarized will undoubtedly have an effect on the 
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ideological composition of the Congress in the future as elected officials will follow their 
constituents’ positions in order to remain in office (Downs 1957). This development has obvious 
implications for the future of American government (Davis and Mason 2016). 
 
The Polarization Debate 
        Polarization of the American public has been the study of extensive research in recent 
decades. Beginning in 2005 and continuing through the present, Morris Fiorina and his co-
authors propose that the American public is not as polarized as many media accounts 
suggest.  They argue that though polarization may exist, it does not extend outside of the 
“political class” comprised of politicians and strong party activists, claiming that, “most 
Americans are somewhat like the unfortunate citizens of some third-world countries who try to 
stay out of the crossfire while left-wing guerrillas and right–wing death squads shoot at each 
other” (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011, 8).   
Additionally, they observe that the majority of Americans are not interested in and are ill-
informed about politics. When individuals do have opinions, most hold positions in or around the 
center of the ideological spectrum (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011).  Fiorina draws his 
conclusions by comparing survey responses taken from residents in “red states” and those in 
“blue states” (whether a state is red or blue is determined based on the previous presidential 
election.  States where Republican candidates won are red and states where Democratic 
candidates won are blue).  His results reveal no substantial differences between red state and blue 
state respondents (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011).   
Fiorina finds that there are minimal differences on policy preferences and “dividing 
issues” between citizens of red and blue states.  In 2000, residents of red states were just as likely 
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as those in blue states to believe that corporations had too much power and made too much 
profit.  Likewise, similar percentages of residents in blue states agreed with residents in red 
states that government was almost always wasteful and inefficient.  Majorities in both states 
viewed religion as very important, and minorities in both states believed homosexuality should 
be accepted by society (Fiorina Abrams, and Pope 2011).  In 2004, a nearly identical minority of 
residents in red and blue states (46% and 45% respectively) thought that immigration should 
decrease and that homosexual marriage should be allowed (31% and 39%). 
 Fiorina also observes that constituents are reluctant to categorize themselves as 
Republicans or Democrats, choosing instead to identify as an Independent.  A similar 
phenomenon occurs when individuals are asked to categorize their ideological position; few 
categorize themselves as conservatives or liberals, preferring the term moderate (Fiorina, 
Abrams, and Pope 2011).  However, of those who do categorize themselves as conservatives and 
liberals, there are more conservatives dwelling in both the red and blue states.  This indicates that 
the supposed “red state-blue state divide” is more myth than reality. 
Other political scientists have since disputed Fiorina’s claims, including Francia and 
Baumgartner (2006) who claim that the public is indeed polarized, and this polarization is 
evident when comparing survey data between rural and urban populations.  They find that there 
is clear geographic polarization, including a lack of homogeneity even within the red and blue 
states.   
Perhaps the most formidable argument against Fiorina’s is one proposed by Alan 
Abramowitz.  Abramowitz (2013) takes a different approach than Francia and Baumgartner and 
claims that polarization is evident in survey data from red and blue states, and shows Americans 
are deeply divided, especially on key issues such as, healthcare, abortion, gay marriage and other 
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cultural, geographic, and economic issues.  He argues that the American public has become 
fixated on party membership and loyalty and, consequently, has damaged Republicans’ and 
Democrats’ ability to work with each other (Abramowitz 2013).  He rejects Fiorina’s claim that 
the polarization is only evident in the political class claiming instead that, “there is no disconnect 
between elected officials and the voters who put them in office…. Polarization is not a result of a 
failure of representation; it is the result of successful representation” (Abramowitz 2013, Preface 
xiii). 
Abramowitz counters Fiorina’s claim that individuals’ self-identification indicates the 
opposite of polarization with data that the average ideological position for self-identified 
Democrats moves steadily towards “strong liberal” while the average position for self-identified 
Republicans moves steadily towards “strong conservative” (Abramowitz 2013).  Additionally, he 
graphs the average ideological position for self-identified Democrats and Republicans compared 
to the average ideological placement for each party.  If the electorate is truly a collection of 
moderates being forced to choose between two ideologically polarized parties, then both 
Democrats and Republicans should categorize themselves in the exact middle of the two parties.  
Instead, Democrats and Republicans both categorize themselves extremely close to their 
respective parties (Abramowitz 2013).  The largest discrepancy is in the 1970s when the public 
position for Democrats averaged 3.7 while the Democratic Party’s average was 3.4; however, the 
prevalence of conservative, Southern Democrats likely explains this result.  
Abramowitz also has data that indicate Americans are polarized on key issues.  
Individuals who perceived universal health care as either important or very important in 2008 
were deeply divided on whether healthcare should be a purely private or governmental function.  
When asked their opinions on universal healthcare, approximately 70% of Democrats “favored it 
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a great deal” while 70% of Republicans “opposed it a great deal” (Abramowitz 2013).  There is 
also clear separation on the topic of abortion over time (1980-present).   In 1980, white 
Democrats were closely divided between the pro-choice and pro-life stance, 49% to 49%.  In 
2008, a gap had developed and grown to 61% pro-choice and 28% pro-life. 
        Given the conflicting assessments in the academic literature, the purpose of this study is 
to use the most recent survey data available to determine whether Fiorina (Culture War: The 
Myth of Polarized America) or Abramowitz (The Polarized Public: Why American Government 
is So Dysfunctional) better depicts the reality of polarization (or the lack thereof) in 
contemporary American political life.  Additionally, the country has changed significantly since 
Fiorina first published his findings in 2005, and it is arguably different still since his last 
examination in 2011 and Abramowitz’s examination in 2013; one does not need to look far for 
evidence of the changes. 
Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) find that issue partisanship, or liberal/conservative 
identification, has increased, allowing parties to attract individuals more easily into their camps 
by effectively sorting them into ideological, moral, social, and economic viewpoints.  However, 
they do not find strong evidence to indicate that there is public polarization on key issues (new 
lifestyles, traditional values, abortion, affirmative action, federal spending for the environment, 
moral behavior, and equality). Hence, their results do not point to deep divisions on what are 
typically considered “polarizing” issues (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).  In short, there is more 
evidence for party sorting than issue-based polarization.  However, others argue just the 
opposite; they claim political parties have managed to sort the electorate into their ideological 
camps based on issues that have the most traction and salience by taking more distinct stances on 
these issues (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman, Casey, and Horowitz 2006).  
Senior Honors Project   Stamper  
 
   
 
 7 
 Others still have explored the possible impact of the advances in technology, media bias, 
the prevalence of campaign ads, and the rise of social media on the American electorate from a 
variety of standpoints such as political socialization, partisan sorting, informative power, and 
even their positive effects on the democratic process (Davis and Dunaway 2016; Dellavigna and 
Kaplan 2007; Farrell, Lawrence, and Sides 2008; Geer 2010). Social media allow individuals to 
bypass information from those with whom they disagree and instead turn to their own 
information sources comprised solely of those with whom they share similar beliefs (Sunstein 
2018).  Individuals prefer messages that are already in line with their current views, which could 
be contributing to the increased polarization in recent decades (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 
2009; 2011).   
Regardless of what factors some scholars may argue are contributing to polarization, the 
fact remains that the world of American politics has changed and so have the opinions of the 
American electorate.  Even if all the academic literature above is discounted, the 2016 election 
would be reason enough to reexamine polarization as it saw not only nasty attacks of those with 
contrasting views—both candidate-on-candidate and citizen-on-citizen attacks—but the rise of 
extremely polarized candidates themselves.  From a business man promising to build a wall 
along the southern border to a self-proclaimed democratic-socialist who favors tax rates as high 
as 90%, primary voters responded favorably to both.  Immediately after the election, there were 
protests across the nation, and deep division remains today, two years later.  At least anecdotally, 
there are plenty of examples that people no longer politely disagree with each other’s policy 
preferences; instead, we prefer to attack each other on personal and moral grounds and claim 
they, and those like them, will be the downfall of the country.  It is for reasons such as these that 
an updated examination of the political polarization of the American public is needed. 
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Research Questions and Hypothesis 
This research centers around the research question: Is the American public politically 
polarized? The hypotheses of Fiorina and Abramowitz are tested to answer this research 
question.  The American National Election Studies (ANES) is used to compare and contrast the 
two claims.  
If Fiorina’s hypothesis is correct, then analyzing public survey data would reveal that a 
majority of Americans have opinions that are situated in the middle, or moderate, position.  A 
graph of the data would form a normal distribution, a bell curve.  If Abramowitz is correct, then 
an analysis of public opinion surveys would reveal a majority of opinions in the extremes of the 
spectrum instead of in the middle.  The graph would then shift from a normally distributed bell 
curve to a bimodal, or “u” shaped, curve. 
Methodology 
        The ANES is used because it allows for the analysis of responses over several decades 
and therefore provides a better picture of shifts in public opinion. Polarization of the electorate is 
evident over many facets of political life—and even nonpolitical, some would argue (Iyengar and 
Westwood 2014).  For this reason, I chose to analyze several separate indicators: ideological 
self-identification, feelings towards presidents of the opposite party, feelings toward the opposite 
party in general, and opinions on policy issues.   
Research shows that while the electorate may have followed the lead of party elites and 
national parties, the public has ultimately become more ideologically consistent and our political 
system would be unrecognizable without the alignment (Abramowitz 2010; Baumer and Howard 
2016; Levendusky 2009) so, I examined how Democrats and Republicans placed themselves on 
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the ideological spectrum.  There also has been extensive research on issue polarization (Adams 
2014: Carsey and Layman 2006; Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Mason 2014), meaning that there 
is a deep divide in opinions between Republicans and Democrats on salient policy issues; 
therefore, I examine the changing opinions of Democrats and Republicans on three long-term 
and relevant issues: health insurance, abortion, and immigration.  Finally, polarization can be 
measured on the basis of Republicans’ and Democrats’ feelings towards the opposite party 
(Iyengar and Westwood 2014: Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018); this led me to examine how 
Republicans and Democrats respond on feeling thermometers towards presidents—particularly 
those of the opposite party— and the opposite party as a whole.  
 Comparison of the average responses (means) of  Republicans and Democrats each year 
and cross tabulation analysis is used to determine if there is any evidence of political polarization 
at the surface level on Democrats’ and Republicans’ ideological self-placement, opinions on 
three long-term and prevalent policy issues—health insurance, abortion, and immigration — and 
feelings towards the opposite party itself and presidents of the opposite party.  After the cross 
tabulation analysis and a comparison of the mean responses establishes that Democrats and 
Republicans were indeed divided, and deeply divided, increasingly more so with the passage of 
time, I use multi-variate analysis to ensure that the polarization on the policy issues is primarily a 
result of respondents’ political party identification and not other factors.  Additionally, after 
establishing that political party identification is indeed the dividing factor, predictive probability 
distributions are used to determine the policy positions of strong party identifiers, party 
identifiers, weak party identifiers, and pure independents.  The methods of analysis for cross 
tabulations, comparisons of means, regressions, and predictive probabilities are each explained in 
more detail below. For all three methods, the ANES time series data from 1948- 2016 is used to 
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not only identify potential polarization in recent years, but also to compare to polarization in 
years past.   
Cross tabulations are used to analyze the distribution of Republicans’ and Democrats’ 
responses on 7-point Likert scales and similar scales of a smaller range (4-point or 5-point).  In 
order to ensure accuracy when measuring the suspected polarization in the American public, I 
analyze questions in which individuals are asked about their opinion on a current issue (abortion, 
immigration, health insurance) or are asked to categorize their ideological leanings on a 1-7 scale 
where 1 represents "strong liberal" and 7 represents "strong conservative."  The opinions on 
issues are categorized on a scale that varies from question to question, but the scale and meaning 
are defined for each issue.  Any responses labeled “Do not know” or “Did not answer” or any 
such similar responses are excluded.   
When polarization does not exist, then a graph of public opinions is a bell curve with the 
majority of responses collecting around the middle, or moderate, viewpoint.  For example, if 
there is no ideological polarization, a majority of Americans would ideologically categorize 
themselves as a 3, 4, or 5 (on a 7-point scale) and thus create a bell curve.  When polarization 
does exist, however, there are a greater percentage of responses gathered in the extremes of the 
scales creating an inverse bell curve.  For example, if the ideology scales indicate polarization, 
the largest numbers of responses are concentrated in the left (1-2) and right (6-7) sides making 
the graph look more like a ‘u’ than a bell curve.  This holds true for scales of any number; 
measured on a scale of 5 and with no polarization, the majority of response should cluster around 
2, 3, and 4 as opposed to 1 and 5. 
I also analyze feeling thermometer scales for how positively or negatively Democrats and 
Republicans feel towards presidents while they were in office and towards the opposite party.  A 
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response of 51-100 degrees indicates a more favorable feeling while a response of 0-49 degrees 
indicates a more negative feeling.  A response of 50 indicates a completely neutral opinion.  For 
the purposes of visual representation of how polarized the American public is in their feelings 
towards Republican and Democrat Presidents and the Republican and Democrat parties, I recode 
the 1-100 scale into a condensed, 5-point scale and used a cross tabulation analysis.  Reponses of 
0-19 degrees are coded as 1, 20-39 degrees as 2, 40-59 degrees as 3, 60-79 degrees as 4, and 80-
100 degrees as 5.  Category 1 represents a very unfavorable opinion, 2 an unfavorable opinion, 3 
a neutral opinion, 4 a favorable opinion, and 5 a very favorable opinion.  Once again, responses 
of “Do not know” or “Did not answer” or other such similar responses were excluded. Using the 
same methods, I also examined feeling thermometer data for how self-identified Democrats and 
Republicans feel towards the opposite party. 
 Since all responses to the ANES are recorded on numerical scales, I also compare the 
mean response of Republicans and Democrats over time to demonstrate how polarized the public 
has become.  When polarization exists, the average response for Republicans moves steadily 
toward the most conservative choice while the average response for Democrats moves to the 
more liberal choice.  As the average opinion moves farther and farther towards the extremes, 
there is clear separation in the graph.  This logically follows cross tabulation data because as 
more and more respondents categorize their opinions in the extremes of the scale, those 
responses will pull the mean towards the tail end of the scale.  The mean response for both 
Republicans and Democrats was analyzed for the ideological self-identification, all three policy 
issues, and the two feeling thermometers for each year data are available.  Those responses are 
graphed chronologically over time to represent visually how the gap in the opinions of 
Republicans and Democrats grows. 
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 Since a surface level analysis of distribution of responses and comparison of the average 
responses reveals deep divisions between Republicans and Democrats, regression analysis is 
used to control for other characteristics that could cause the respondents to have such dividing 
responses.  Factors such as age, gender, race, education level, and family income are controlled 
for.  To aid in the understanding of the regression models, I use predictive probabilities (King, 
Tomz, and Wittenberg 2002) to translate the regression findings back onto each issues’ 
individual scale thus showing how each respondent would respond to that question based on their 
party identification and controlling for the demographic factors.   
 While only the charts for the first year the questions appear in the ANES and 2016 are 
included in the Findings section, charts for every year data is available can be found in the 
Appendix to visually demonstrate the shift in opinions over time.  The mean values for 
Republicans and Democrats as well as the expected responses for partisans generated in the 
predictive probabilities are also included in the Appendix. 
 
Findings 
Comparison of Means and Cross Tabulations for Ideological Self-Identification and 
Feeling Thermometers 
 In 1972, when asked to identify themselves on a 7-point scale ranging from "very liberal" 
to "very conservative," the mean score for Democrats was 3.77 and the mean score for 
Republicans was 4.64.  When asked the same question in 2016, the mean score for Democrats 
was 3.05 and the mean score for Republicans was 5.3.  This indicates that Democrats in 2016 
were 19.25% “more liberal” than Democrats in 1972 while Republicans in 2016 were 14.33% 
“more conservative” than Republicans in 1972.  Figure 1 shows the steady widening of mean 
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ideological scores for Democrats and Republicans since 1972.   In 1972, Republicans and 
Democrats were separated by .87 and by 2016, the spread had grown to 2.26.  A 160.73% 
increase in spread.  If there was no polarization, then there would be a minimal or nonexistent 
gap between the means of Democrats and Republicans.  However, as the gap expands an 




There is also evidence of polarization in the distribution of how liberal or conservative 
Democrats and Republicans categorize themselves.  In 1972, 36.3% of Democrats and 33.4% of 
Republicans categorized themselves as “moderate” (category 4).  Conversely, 19.3% of 
Democrats categorized themselves as “strong liberals” (category 1) or “liberals” (category 2) 
while 24.7% of Republicans categorized themselves as “strong conservatives” (category 7) or 
“conservatives” (category 6).  In 2016, 29.5% of Democrats and 19.3% of Republicans 
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“strong liberals” or liberals,” and 52.6% of Republicans categorized themselves as either “strong 
conservatives” or “conservatives.”  Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the shift in the distribution from 
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 There is also evidence of polarization in the feeling thermometer data. In 1968, 90.3% of 
Democrats and 72.1% of Republicans felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable towards Lyndon 
Johnson.  In 2016, 94.4% of Democrats felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable towards Barrack 
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A similar phenomenon holds true for Republican presidents and presidential candidates.  
In 1970, 98.1% of Republicans and 78.6% of Democrats felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable 
towards Richard Nixon.  In 2008, 83.6% of Republicans and 35.7% of Democrats felt neutral, 
favorable, or very favorable towards George W. Bush.  Additionally, in 2016, 82.5% of 
Republicans and 16.7% of Democrats felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable towards then 
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 Since 1968, Democrats and Republicans feelings towards presidents of the opposite 
political party have declined steadily as indicated not only by the increase in percentage of 
respondents who feel “unfavorably” or “very unfavorably,” but also by the mean of all 
responses. In 1970, on the condensed feeling thermometer, the average Democrat response 
towards a Republican president (President Nixon at the time) was 3.03, which represents a 
“neutral” response.  By 2016, the average Democrat response for a Republican candidate 
(Trump) was 1.52, which would represent a “very unfavorable” response. This is a 1.51 change 
on a five-point scale.  There is a similar decline in opinion for Republicans’ feelings towards 
Democratic presidents.  In 1968, the average Republican response toward a Democratic president 
(President Johnson) was 3.04, which is once again a “neutral” response.  In 2016, the average 
Republican response toward a Democratic president (President Obama) was 1.92, which can be 
interpreted as “very unfavorable.”  A comparison of the means is also represented on a full 
feeling thermometer as coded by the ANES—not in the condensed five categories.  For 
Democrat presidents, the average response moves from 66.7 for Democrats in 1968 to 79.37 in 
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for Republican presidents as Democrats move from 46.78 in 1970 to 25.58 in 2008 and 
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 Republicans’ and Democrats’ distaste for presidents of the opposite party is mirrored by 
their growing distaste for the entire party in general.  In 1978, the data was normally distributed 
in almost a perfect bell curve as 50% of Democrats felt neutral; when combining categories, 
82.9% of Democrats felt “neutral,” “favorable,” or “very favorable” towards the Republican 
Party. By comparison, 55.4% of Republicans felt “neutral” while 82.3% felt “neutral,” 
“favorable,” or “very favorable” towards the Democrat Party. By 2016, however, only 35% of 
Democrats felt “neutral,” “favorable,” or “very favorable” towards the Republican Party, 
whereas 61.6% of Republicans felt likewise towards the Democrat Party.  Figures 11 and 12 
represent this. 
Similar to the previous graphs, a normally distributed bell curve indicates a lack of 
polarization; however, polarization would not be represented by a bimodal curve in this instance.  
Since these figures represent the responses towards the opposite party, if the average 





















AVERAGE FULL FEELING THERMOMETER 
RESPONSES OF PARTY IDENTIFERS TOWARDS 
REPUBLICAN PRESIENDENTS BY YEAR
Democrats Republicans
Senior Honors Project   Stamper  
 
   
 
 21 
the graph should move from a normal distribution to a right-skewed graph as a greater 





 Once again, the mean feeling thermometer response of Republicans and Democrats 
towards the opposite party paints a similar picture.  In 1978, the average Democrat response 
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Democrat Party was 3.35.  On the condensed feeling thermometer, both represent a neutral 
opinion.  In 2016, the average Democrat response was 1.86 and the average Republican response 
was 1.92.  Both of these responses represent an unfavorable response. On a five point scale, 
Democrats moved down 1.20 points—a 39% change— while Republicans moved down 1.44—a 
42% change.  Once again, the average response on the full feeling thermometer is also given. In 
1978, the average Democrat response towards the Republican Party was 48.32, which dropped to 
26.96 in 2016.  Similarly, the average Republican response towards the Democrat Party dropped 
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Comparison of Means and Cross Tabulations for Salient Policy Issues  
Even beyond citizens’ ideological self-placement and their feelings towards presidents of 
the opposite party and the opposite party in general, there is evidence to suggest that citizens are 
polarized on key issues—health insurance, abortion, and immigration.  These issues were chosen 
because of their long-term prevalence in American politics.   
Health insurance has been a polarizing issuing in the United States since Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society and the introduction of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965 and continues to 
be today.  The data indicate spikes in polarization that are responsive to each of the health 
insurance reforms implemented since the 1960s.  However, though American’s opinions on 
health insurance are somewhat fluid depending on the most recent health care policies, the data 
indicate that polarization has none-the-less increased steadily since the 1970s and the gap in 
opinions between Republicans and Democrats is greater now than ever before.  
The ANES first asked citizens’ opinions on health insurance in 1970 and asked them to 
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be a government insurance plan that covers all medical and hospital expenses while a response of 
7 represents the opinion that medical expenses should be paid for by individuals or private health 
insurance plans.  Of course, individuals can hold opinions somewhere in between that is 
represented by a response of 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 with 4 representing a neutral position.  In 1970, the 
average response for Republicans was 4.58 while the average response for Democrats was 3.44, 
which is a spread of 1.15.  While the spread is large for a 7-point scale, both parties’ averages are 
about .5 points away from the neutral response.  By 2016, the average response for Republicans 
was 5.22, which is a 13.9% percent change from 1970.  The average response for Democrats 
steadily shifted more to the left coming to rest at 3.09 in 2016, which is a 10.2% change from 
1970.  Overall, the gap between the average responses from both parties grows to an even more 

























AVERAGE RESPONSES OF PARTY IDENTIFIERS ON 
HEALTH INSURANCE BY YEAR
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 In addition to the widening gap in average opinion held by Republicans and Democrats, 
the percentage of individuals who respond in the extreme, tail, ends of the 7-point scale (1-2 and 
6-7), also indicates polarization.  In 1970, 12.8% of Democrats and 17.3% of Republicans 
responded 4 (the neutral position).  Conversely, 45.8% of Democrats responded 1 or 2 and 
44.8% of Republicans responded 6 or 7.  In 2016, the percentage of neutral responses (4) for 
Democrats was 21.5% and for Republicans it was 16.4%.  In the extremes, 43.1% of Democrats 
responded 1 or 2 while 52.2% of Republicans responded 6 or 7.  Therefore, Democrats 
experiences a 5% decrease in extreme response while percentage of Republicans with extreme 
responses grew 16%.  This indicates that Republicans have certainly become more polarized 
when it comes to government vs private health insurance, but Democrats have shifted little over 
the past 40-50 years.  Of course, part of the shift in Republicans opinions could be due to the 
health insurance policies of President Clinton and Obama in the past 20 years.  Figures 15 and 16 
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 Health insurance is not the only popular issue Americans are polarized about.  Abortion 
has also been a divisive issue since even before its legalization in Roe v. Wade (1973).  The 
ANES asks respondents their opinions on a 4-point scale, but unlike most of the other opinion 
questions, this scale is reversed.  Meaning that a response of 1 is the most conservative response 
and the responses become more liberal the higher in number they are as opposed to the more 
common scales where 1 is the most liberal responses and responses become steadily more 
conservative as the number increases. The most conservative response, 1, represents the opinion, 
“By law, abortion should never be permitted,” 2 represents, “The law should permit abortion 
only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger,” 3 represents,  “The law 
should permit abortion for reason other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only 
after the need for the abortion has been clearly established,” and finally, the most liberal 
response, 4, represents, “By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a 
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scale instead of a 5 or 7-point one, could cause the polarization to seem insignificant when 
displayed visually as the data points obviously cannot separate as much as they could on a larger, 
more robust scale. 
 In 1980, the data indicate low polarization as the average response for Democrats and 
Republicans was extremely close, and the Republicans’ average response was surprisingly, 
slightly more liberal than the Democrats’.  Democrats had an average response of 2.80 and 
Republicans was 2.82.  By 2016, the gap had widened significantly and Republicans were solidly 
closer to the conservative response than Democrats.  The average Democrat response was 3.32 
and the average Republican response was 2.52.  The percentage of change for Democrats was 
18.61% while it is only 10.7% change for Republicans.   Therefore, while Republicans may have 
had a larger opinion shift in regards to health insurance, Democrats shifted more on the topic of 
abortion.  Additionally, the gap grows from a very close .03 to a much larger .8 on a 4-point 
scale, which is a 3,088% increase in under 40 years.  Therefore, Republicans and Democrats 
have become so polarized that it is immediately evident despite the restrictions of a smaller 
response scale than health insurance or immigration (discussed as the next issue).   Figure 17 
shows the widening gap in average responses between Republicans and Democrats.  
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 Once again, polarization is also evident in the percentage of Republicans and Democrats 
who respond in the extreme categories, 1 (in this case, the most conservative) and 4 (the most 
liberal).  In 1980, 9% of Republicans responded 1 (“By law, abortion should never be 
permitted”) and 33.8% of Democrats responded 4 (By law, a woman should always be able to 
obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice”).  By 2016, the percentages in the extremes 
nearly doubled for both parties. Approximately, 19.1% of Republicans responded with 1 and 
62.9% of Democrats responded with 4.  There is also evidence of party sorting throughout the 
past 40 years.  In 1980, the percentage of Republicans who responded with 4 was nearly as high 
as the percentage of Democrats.  This indicates that the parties have become more ideologically 
cohesive on key issues.  Additionally, many Republicans believe in individual liberty and 
individuals’ autonomy over their lives, which could explain the higher percentage of 
Republicans respondents in the 4 category than would could be traditionally expected.  Figures 
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 There is also evidence of increasing polarization regarding immigration.  Beginning in 
1990, respondents were asked their opinions regarding whether the number of immigrants should 
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number of immigrants should be, “increased a lot,” 2, “increased a little,” 3, “same as now,” 4, 
“decreased a little,” and 5, “decreased a lot.”  
 Once again, there is evidence of low polarization in 1992, when the question was first 
asked, as the average response for Republicans was 3.66, which is extremely close to the 
Democrat average which was 3.56.  However, over the next 20 years, the gap would grow from a 
pretty insignificant .1 to a much larger .86 which is a 760% increase as the Republican average 
response moved to 3.92 and the Democrat average response move to 3.06.   While such a large 
percentage of change is shocking over 24 years in itself, what is even more significant is that the 
overwhelming majority of the gap between the two parties’ average response comes in the last 
10 years.  Through 2008, the average response stayed extremely close to each other; the most 
they were separated by was .14 in 2004, but in 2012, the gap grew to .35 and ultimately 
continued growing to be the .86 gap in 2016 as discussed above.  Figure 20 demonstrates this 
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 The evidence of polarization is once again furthered by analyzing the percentage of 
respondents who selected the extreme responses (responses 1 and 5).  In 1992, only 3% of 
Democrats responded 1 while 24.1% of Republicans responded 5 (for reference, 22.2% of 
Democrats also responded 5).  A response of 3, the moderate “stay the same” response, was 
selected by nearly half of all Republicans and Democrats with 44.3% and 42.8% respectively.  In 
2016, however, Republicans move towards and Democrats move away from the 5 category with 
38.8% of Republicans and 12% of Democrats selecting it.  Now, 8.6% of Democrats respond 1.  
The moderate, 3, response also saw change as now 47.1% of Democrats and 31.4% of 
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Multi-variate Analysis: Regression Models and Predictive Probability 
 While there are clear differences between Republicans and Democrats on salient policy 
issues, could these differences possibly be explained by other factors, such as demographic 
differences?  Using an OLS regression model, I examine that possibility.  The dependent variable 
for each regression is the respondents’ opinion on each issue—health insurance, abortion, and 
immigration—on that issue’s scale as defined above.  The primary explanatory variable is the 
respondents party identification on a 7-point Likert scale where a response 1 represents “Strong 
Democrat”, 2 represents “Democrat,” 3 represents “Weak Democrat,” 4 represents 
“Independent,” 5 represents “Weak Republican,” 6 represents “Republican,’ and 7 represents 
“Strong Republican.”  I control for common demographic variables that are often considered to 
affect an individuals’ opinion on political issues: age, gender, race, education level, and family 
income. 
 For each of the three issues, there is a simple regression without controls and a regression 
with the controls.  This is done to show that adding the controls actually weakens the adjusted 
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increases the adjusted R2 value slightly.  This coupled with the findings of the analysis indicate 
that an individuals’ party identification is strongly related to their opinion on policy issues, and 
more consistently so than other demographic factors.  Three years with presidential elections 
were selected for comparison. 
Table 1: Opinion on Health Insurance without controls: 1972, 1996, and 2016 
 1972 1996 2016 
    
Party ID 7pt .224 (.036)*** .339 (.021)*** .457 (.013)*** 










* p < .05 **p < .01 *** p< .001 
Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National 
Election Studies. 
 
Table 2: Opinion on Health Insurance: 1972, 1996, and 2016 
 1972 1996 2016 
    
Party ID 7pt .176 (.038)*** .316 (.025)*** .419 (.016)*** 
Controls    
Age  -.008 (.005) .007 (.003)* .010 (.002)*** 
Male -.264 (.151) .044 (.1) -.039 (.067) 
Black -1.048 (.259)*** .198 (.165) .359 (.122)** 
Hispanic -.865 (.718) -.031 (.173) -.120 (.113) 
Other -.149 (.972) -.608 (.333) -.122 (.129) 
Education Level -.029 (.05) .031 (.037) -.010 (.027) 
Family Income .231 (.074)** .290 (.051)*** .185 (.033) 










* p < .05 **p < .01 *** p< .001 
Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National 
Election Studies.  
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Table 3: Opinion on Immigration without controls: 1992, 2004, and 2016 
 1992 2004 2016 
    
Party ID 7pt .026 (.010)* .032 (.014)* .186 (.008)*** 










* p < .05 **p < .01 *** p< .001 
Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National 
Election Studies. 
 
Table 4: Opinion on Immigration: 1992, 2004, and 2016 
 1992 20004 2016 
    
Party ID 7pt .014 (.012) .038 (.017)* .167 (.010)*** 
Controls    
Age  -.002 (.001) .003 (.002)* .009 (.001)*** 
Male .035 (.046) -.29 (.067) -.075 (.039) 
Black -.204 (.073)** -.003 (.103) -.079 (.069) 
Hispanic -.058 (.084) -.417 (.114)*** -.286 (.065)*** 
Other -.086 (.159) -.556 (.177)*** -.227 (.077)** 
Education Level -.073 (.017)*** -.153 (.026)*** -.090 (.015)*** 
Family Income .046 (.023)* .038 (.031) -.030 (.019) 










* p < .05 **p < .01 *** p< .001 
Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National 
Election Studies.  
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Table 5: Opinion on Abortion without controls: 1980, 1996, and 2016 
 1980 1996 2016 
    
Party ID 7pt .020 (.014)* -.077 (.013)*** -.173 (.008)*** 










* p < .05 **p < .01 *** p< .001 
Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National 
Election Studies. 
 
Table 6: Opinion on Abortion: 1980, 1996, and 2016 
 1980 1996 2016 
    
Party ID 7pt -0.012 (.015) -.101 (.015)*** -.182 (.009)*** 
Controls    
Age  -.006 (.002)*** -.005 (.002)** .000 (.001) 
Male .012 (.058) -.04 (.058) .041 (.036) 
Black -.129 (.095) -.208 (.096)* -.135 (.064)* 
Hispanic -.005 (.141) -.277 (.102)** -.361 (.060)*** 
Other .232 (.309) -.452 (.19)* -..065 (.069) 
Education Level .132 (.021)*** .124 (.021)*** .112 (.014)*** 
Family Income .098 (.028)*** .081 (.029)** .085 (.018)*** 










* p < .05 **p < .01 *** p< .001 
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 To explain the results further of the regression analysis, I use predictive estimates 
generated using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2002) to allow for a better visual 
representation of how much an individuals’ party identification can affect their opinion on health 
insurance, abortion, and immigration, while controlling for the demographic variables.  Figures 
23, 25 and 27 show the stance of strong party identifiers (1 and 7) and pure independents (4).  
Figures 24, 26, and 28 represent the stance of all party identifiers (1-3 and 5-7) and independents 
(4), as well as the mean response on the party identification scale.  The mean response on the 
party identification scale is included to show the average person’s opinion the issues. Though it 
is extremely close to the independent response, it does vary slightly and provides insight to the 
ideological leanings of the average voter that also varies depending on the issue. 
 The predictive estimates reinforce the descriptive analysis.  Health insurance was already 
a topic of contention in the 1970s and only becomes more polarized as we move into the present; 
Figures 23 and 24 illustrate this shift.  In 1970, the estimated response for a strong Republican 
was 4.69, the estimated response for a strong Democrat was 3.56, and the estimated Independent 
response was 4.13.  By 2016, strong party identifiers move substantially father into their 
respective ideological camps, and Independents remain relatively unchanged at 4.1.  Strong 
Republicans’ estimated placement is 5.35, whereas strong Democrats’ estimated placement is 
2.85.  There is a similar, but smaller, amount of growth in weaker identifiers.  Democrats (2) 
move from 3.75 to 3.26, weak Democrats (3) from 3.94 to 3.68, weak Republicans (5) from 4.31 
to 3.52, and Republicans (6) from 4.5 to 4.94.  Once again, the opinions on health insurance are 
highly affected by the changes in the law implemented be Democratic presidents (Johnson’s 
Great Society, Clinton’s health care reform, and Obama care).  Despite this, strong Republicans 
desire to have insurance be a largely privately funded entity is greater than ever and strong 
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Democrats desire for the opposite—largely government funded—is almost as low as is it was in 
1992 in the midst of Clinton’s campaign health care reform promises.  The initiation of these 
programs by Democrat presidents could be what caused the strong Republicans to have a higher 
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Abortion and immigration have moved away from topics of general agreement to highly 
polarizing issues.  Both issues have nearly identical responses for over a decade before the 
opinions indicate any level of polarization.  When the opinions do finally split, they do so 
intensely; this further indicates that public opinion on key issues responds to certain triggers. 
With the exception of 1984, there is almost no movement by any party identifiers on the 
topic of abortion until 1992; as illustrated by Figures 25 and 26, a gap developed and grows 
through the present.  This 1992 split can most likely be attributed to the Supreme Court cases 
regarding abortion (namely Planned Parenthood v. Casey 1991 when the trimester approach was 
replaced with the undue burden standard).  Though party identifiers remained relatively stagnant 
around the ideological center for a decade, they are much more ideologically sorted today.  
Strong Democrats move from 2.84 in 1980 to 3.49 in 2016 and strong Republicans move from 
2.76 to 2.39 (as mentioned above, the abortion scale is “backwards,” and the most conservative 
response is represented by 1 while the most liberal response by 4).  True independents remained 
relatively constant throughout, but do become slightly more liberal in their responses moving 
from 2.8 to 2.95.  Weaker party identifiers fall in line and move according towards their 
respective ideological camps as well: Democrats (2) moved from 2.83 to 3.3, weak Democrats 
(3) from 2.81 to 3.12, weak Republicans (5) from 2.79 to 2.76, and Republicans (6) from 2.78 to 
2.57.   Contrarily to the topic of health insurance, strong Democrats have changed their opinions 
much more than strong Republicans (22% vs 13%); however, as mentioned above, Republicans 
are more likely to support individual liberty and this could affect their feelings regarding 
abortion.  
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Interestingly, opinions on immigration remain almost exactly identical even for strong 
party identifiers until 2012.  Then, the scale is, in effect, “blown wide open” and the gap in 
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promises of Donald Trump to build/reinforce physical borders and the unrivaled hatred and 
adoration of those statements by some Democrats and some Republicans respectively.  As figure 
27 and 28 represent, strong Democrats could be expected to respond 3.65 in 1990 and 3.07 in 
2016 while strong Republicans expected response move from 3.73 in 1990 to 4.07 in 2016.  
Once again, Independents experience low movement and their small shift is towards the 
ideological left moving from 3.69 to 3.57.  Democrats (2) move from 3.66 to 3.24, weak 
Democrats (3) from 3.68 to3.41, weak Republicans (5) from 3.7 to 3.74, and Republicans (6) 
from 3.72 to 3.91.  The ANES immigration question is asked on a 5-point scale and a gap of 1 
(3.07 and 4.07) should be unheard of in a society devoid of mass, public polarization, as some 
would claim we live in.  Even weak party identifiers have a gap of .33 (3.41 and 3.74).   
What is highly intriguing and also concerning about this gap in opinions on immigration 
is its development and growth in just 8 years.  Also intriguing is how the Democrats expected 
position on immigration never falls below the moderate response (3 on this 5-point scale); so, 
while Republicans became much more conservative on the topic of immigration, Democrats do 
not become much more liberal.  This could be because both parties started closer to the 
conservative position in 1990.  However, Democrats had a greater percentage of change (15.89% 
vs 9.11%), so their opinions could eventually move firmly into the “liberal camp.”  This trend 
should be followed closely in the coming years.  
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 This research provides evidence that the American public is, indeed, polarized on three 
separate measures of polarization—ideological self-identification, feelings towards the opposite 
party and key figures within that party, and stances on salient policy issues—using both 
descriptive and multi-variate analysis.  A higher proportion of party identifiers are more likely to 
identify at the tail ends of the ideological spectrum, the scales showing policy preference, and the 
feeling thermometers towards presidents and the opposite party.  The mean response for all three 
scales mentioned has also moved farther and farther towards the extremes and the gap between 
Republicans and Democrats has grown, or in some cases developed and grown, and grown at a 
higher rate in the last 10 years.  The multi-variate analysis provides further evidence for the 
separation between party identifiers and indicates that demographic factors do not affect 
individuals’ policy preferences as much as their party identification.  In short, the American 
public has become increasingly polarized along party lines with both strong and weak party 
identifiers having sizeable gaps in opinions when compared to their opposite party counterparts. 
 Moving forward, more examination of causes of the polarization seems in order. 
Similarly, the trend of Republicans becoming more conservative on the topic of immigration, but 
Democrats hovering around the moderate position should be followed as more data become 
available; this should especially be the case if Democrats’ opinions continue to become more 
liberal at a faster rate than Republicans’ opinions become more conservative.  Examination of 
why Republicans experience a greater shift on some issues and Democrats on others would also 
contribute to the conversation of polarization. In the meantime, it is safe to say that the divisions 
found between Democrats and Republicans indicate that the United States is, indeed, a polarized 
nation.  
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Mean responses for Republicans and Democrats on Ideology for each year data is available in 
the ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
Year Democrats Republicans Year Democrats Republicans 
1972 3.7719 4.637 1994 3.6621 5.1157 
1974 3.7347 4.7351 1996 3.5737 5.1873 
1976 3.7919 4.8847 1998 3.4965 4.9459 
1978 3.8252 4.9761 2000 3.4189 5.0528 
1980 3.8252 4.9761 2002 3.3994 5.194 
1982 3.8497 4.9939 2004 3.6392 5.1606 
1984 3.6787 4.849 2008 3.4754 5.2148 
1986 3.8386 4.787 2012 3.3994 5.2742 
1988 3.8213 4.9414 2016 3.0458 5.3014 
1990 3.786 4.6837    
1992 3.6016 4.9196    
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Condensed Feeling Thermometer Towards Presidents Cross Tabulations for each year data is 
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Mean Condense Feeling Thermometer responses for Republicans and Democrats on presidents 
for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
 
Year (President) Democrat Republican Year 
(President) 
Democrat Republican 
1968 (Johnson) 3.9528 3.0361 1992 (Bush 
Sr.) 
2.6883 4.1308 
1970 (Nixon) 3.0264 4.4759 1994 
(Clinton) 
4.1837 2.597 
1972 (Nixon) 3.4255 4.5938 1996 
(Clinton) 
4.4004 2.5023 
1974 (Ford) 3.5163 4.2423 1998 
(Clinton) 
4.2021 2.6445 
1976 (Ford) 3.2769 4.3128 2000 
(Clinton) 
4.1991 2.3929 
1978 (Carter) 4.1689 3.3343 2002 (W. 
Bush) 
3.1184 5.6115 
1980 (Carter) 4.0288 2.7273 2004 (W. 
Bush) 
2.3847 4.5394 
1982 (Reagan) 2.7743 4.4449 2008 (W. 
Bush) 
2.0059 3.7152 
1984 (Regan) 2.8956 4.5616 2012 
(Obama) 
4.5132 1.9965 
1986 (Reagan) 3.2254 4.4883 2016 
(Obama) 
4.4591 1.9223 




1990 (Bush Sr.) 3.4301 4.3319    
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Full Feeling Thermometer for Republicans and Democrats on presidents for each year data is 
available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
Year (President) Democrat Republican Year 
(President) 
Democrat Republican 
1968 (Johnson) 66.7 46.2054 1992 (Bush 
Sr.) 
69.5524 52.7473 
1970 (Nixon) 46.7789 79.6268 1994 
(Clinton) 
71.3685 36.7530 
1972 (Nixon) 55.4077 81.0544 1996 
(Clinton) 
73.1316 36.4089 
1974 (Ford) 56.8062 72.2957 1998 
(Clinton) 
75.2343 39.4818 
1976 (Ford) 51.3864 73.9306 2000 
(Clinton) 
72.0238 33.9335 
1978 (Carter) 70.5941 52.636 2002 (W. 
Bush) 
49.5107 81.6188 
1980 (Carter) 67.96 40.528 2004 (W. 
Bush) 
33.5169 80.5456 
1982 (Reagan) 41.2428 76.9528 2008 (W. 
Bush) 
25.5772 31.1853 
1984 (Regan) 44.0436 80.1541 2012 
(Obama) 
80.1731 25.7086 
1986 (Reagan) 50.5568 78.9582 2016 
(Obama) 
79.3679 23.8068 




1990 (Bush Sr.) 55.0852 74.4191    
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Condensed Feeling Thermometer Towards the Opposite Political Party Cross Tabulations for 
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Mean Condensed Feeling Thermometer responses for the opposite party for each year data is 















1978 3.3514 3.0755 1994 2.7304 2.7482 
1980 3.0363 3.2209 1996 2.9364 2.5664 
1982 3.3226 2.7734 1998 3.1468 2.5082 
1984 3.3014 2.9747 2000 2.9348 2.6932 
1986 3.3606 3.0453 2004 2.9286 2.2605 
1988 3.222 3.1166 2008 3.0391 2.195 
1990 3.333 2.9568 2012 2.4186 1.9025 
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Mean Full Feeling Thermometer responses for the opposite party for each year data is available 















1978 47.4094 48.3223 1994 37.6756 45.5881 
1980 44.4066 47.9749 1996 40.2193 41.3068 
1982 45.4501 43.5878 1998 43.5484 37.9907 
1984 47.3845 44.6718 2000 40.3780 41.8495 
1986 46.8984 45.6854 2004 40.8445 37.05 
1988 45.3719 45.6616 2008 39.14 33.3776 
1990 48.5448 45.4366 2012 28.7856 26.3712 
1992 43.0952 40.7788 2016 24.9136 26.9627 
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Mean responses for Republicans and Democrats on health insurance for each year data is 
available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
Year Democrats Republicans Year Democrats Republicans 
1970 3.4362 4.5831 1994 3.3236 4.8869 
1972 3.4902 4.4824 1996 3.3921 4.7953 
1976 3.4937 4.7056 2000 3.3396 4.5497 
1978 3.3887 4.6881 2004 3.056 4.3714 
1984 3.6138 4.4134 2008 2.9629 4.5272 
1998 3.3518 4.4631 2012 3.1264 5.3176 
1992 2.8652 4.1429 2016 3.0857 5.2201 
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Mean responses for Republicans and Democrats on abortion for each year data is available in the 
ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
Year Democrats Republicans Year Democrats Reapublicans 
1980 2.7953 2.8203 1996 3.0387 2.7103 
1982 2.7557 2.8519 1998 3.0386 2.667 
1984 2.8721 2.7442 2000 3.0553 2.6988 
1986 2.8426 2.8758 2004 3.004 2.6988 
1988 2.7868 2.7405 2008 2.9933 2.6177 
1990 2.8902 2.8255 2012 3.2197 2.5823 
1992 3.0924 2.8092 2016 3.3154 2.5184 
1994 3.0025 2.751    
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Mean responses for Republicans and Democrats on immigration for each year data is available in 
the ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
Year Democrats Republicans Year Democrats Republicans 
1992 3.5611 3.6577 2008 3.4239 3.4597 
1994 3.9779 4.0273 2012 3.301 3.6552 
1996 3.7363 3.8213 2016 3.0577 3.918 
1998 3.5321 3.5648    
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Predictive probability responses for partisans on health insurance for each year data is available 
in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
Year Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1970 4.02072 3.56412 3.75141 3.9387 4.126 4.31329 4.50059 4.68788 
1972 3.86143 3.38711 3.56454 3.74198 3.91941 4.09685 5.27528 5.54191 
1976 4.0471 3.51904 3.72889 3.91876 4.10862 4.29848 4.48834 4.6782 
1978 3.77256 3.11695 3.37661 3.63628 3.89594 4.1556 4.41527 4.67493 
1984 4.09946 3.76581 3.86243 3.98905 3.9507 4.19307 4.43543 4.49551 
1988 3.92 3.22361 3.46597 3.70834 3.9507 4.19307 4.43543 4.67779 
1992 3.51703 2.78698 3.05821 3.32944 3.60067 3.87191 4.14314 4.41437 
1994 4.19237 3.20984 3.5411 3.87236 4.20363 4.53489 4.86616 5.19742 
1996 3.92907 3.09766 3.41394 3.73023 4.04651 4.3628 4.67908 4.99537 
2000 3.74947 3.15185 3.38415 3.61645 3.84875 4.08105 4.31355 4.5466 
2004 3.6763 2.98251 3.22141 3.46321 3.69923 3.93813 4.17704 4.41595 
2008 3.61207 2.92016 3.22644 3.53272 3.839 4.14528 4.45144 4.757783 
2012 4.02312 2.95172 3.36717 3.78361 4.20006 4.6165 5.03295 5.4494 
2016 4.09234 2.84652 3.26426 3.682 4.09973 4.51747 4.93521 5.35295 
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Predictive probability responses for partisans on abortion for each year data is available in the 
ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
Year Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1980 2.8079 2.83993 2.82732 2.81471 2.80209 2.78947 2.77686 2.76425 
1982 2.78097 2.7834 2.7824 2.7814 2.7804 2.7794 2.7784 2.7774 
1984 2.81896 2.96365 2.91136 2.85906 2.80677 2.75447 2.70218 2.64988 
1986 2.79532 2.83277 2.82052 2.80527 2.79002 2.77477 2.75952 2.74427 
1988 2.81216 2.90975 2.87557 2.84139 2.80721 2.77304 2.73886 2.70468 
1992 2.99505 3.2619 3.16277 3.06363 2.9645 2.86537 2.76624 2.66711 
1994 2.91239 3.16941 3.08117 2.99293 2.90469 2.81645 2.72821 2.63977 
1996 2.88796 3.15502 3.05346 2.9519 2.85034 2.74878 2.64722 2.54566 
1998 2.96033 3.22482 3.12499 3.02415 2.92382 2.82348 2.72315 2.62281 
2000 2.91772 3.22565 3.11079 2.99592 2.88011 2.76619 2.65133 2.53647 
2004 2.79188 3.15634 3.03218 2.90802 2.78386 2.3597 2.53554 2.41139 
2008 2.90034 3.19734 3.06747 2.93761 2.80775 2.67789 2.54802 2.41816 
2012 2.99137 3.40451 3.24 3.07848 2.91697 2.75546 2.59395 2.43244 
2016 2.94985 3.48531 3.30305 3.12079 2.93853 2.75625 2.574 2.39174 
 
  
Senior Honors Project   Stamper  
 
   
 
 85 
Predictive probability responses for partisans on immigration for each year data is available in 
the ANES Time Series 1948-2016. 
Year Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1990 3.68521 3.64735 3.66141 3.97548 3.68955 3.70362 3.71769 3.73176 
1992 3.68521 3.64735 3.66141 3.67548 3.68955 3.70362 3.71769 3.73176 
1994 4.07667 4.05062 4.05062 4.05955 4.06849 4.07743 4.0953 4.10424 
1996 3.88122 3.87942 3.8801 3.88078 3.88146 3.88214 3.88282 3.8835 
1998 3.63356 3.61845 3.62418 3.62992 3.63565 3.64139 3.64712 3.65283 
2000 3.63826 3.52677 3.56466 3.60256 3.64046 3.67835 3.71625 3.75415 
2004 3.63826 3.52677 3.56466 3.60256 3.64046 3.67835 3.71625 3.75415 
2008 3.53015 3.53116 3.53073 3.53029 3.52986 3.52943 3.52899 3.52856 
2012 2.57855 3.43361 3.49071 3.54781 3.60491 3.66202 3.71912 3.77322 
2016 3.55882 3.07119 3.23711 3.40503 3.57195 3.73887 3.90579 4.07271 
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